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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1049 
___________ 
 
DAMIEN MIKELL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LOUIS FOLINO, Former Superintendent 2;  
ROBERT GILMORE, Former Superintendent 1;  
JEFFREY R. ROGERS, Corrections Classification and Program Manager;  
JABULANI SIBANDA, Corrections Facility Chaplaincy Program Director;  
ABUBAKAR MUHAMMAD, Corrections Chaplain;  
MICHAEL DECARLO, Corrections Food Service Manager 1;  
WALLY DITTSWORTH, Corrections Food Service Manager 2 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-01112) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2018 
 
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed February 13, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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___________ 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Damien Mikell appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for defendants on his claim that his First Amendment right to exercise his 
religion was violated by a number of prison officials during the course of his 
incarceration at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will only recite the 
facts necessary for our discussion; these facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.  On 
July 19, 2012, Mikell was transferred to SCI-Greene from another state institution.  Upon 
his arrival at SCI-Greene, he was housed in the Restricted Housing Unit.  The following 
day, on July 20, 2012, Mikell refused two meals, stating that he was observing the 
Ramadan fast, which had just begun the previous evening.  He also submitted requests to 
a Food Service Supervisor seeking to receive pre-dawn and post-sunset meals during the 
fast and to the Chaplaincy Department to be placed on the Ramadan participation list.  On 
July 23, Food Service Manager Wally Dittsworth advised Mikell to contact the 
Chaplaincy Department to participate in the Ramadan fast.  Two days later, he received a 
response from the Chaplaincy Department, in which Abubakar Muhammad, a 
Corrections Chaplain, attached forms Mikell needed to return to be added to the 
participation list.  Mikell completed and returned the forms that day; his name was 
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subsequently added to the Ramadan participation list.1  Despite this, Mikell never 
received any of the pre-dawn or post-sunset meals that would have allowed him to fast 
for Ramadan once he was placed on the participation list. 
Mikell maintains that in the days following July 25, he received individual cell 
visits from SCI-Greene’s Facility Chaplaincy Program Director, Jabulani Sibanda, and 
Corrections Chaplain Muhammad.  He claims that Sibanda told him that his name had 
been placed on the Ramadan participation list and that he would immediately begin to 
receive meals that would allow him to fast.2  Muhammad allegedly told Mikell that if his 
name had been added to the Ramadan participation list, he would begin to immediately 
receive the appropriate meals. 
Mikell does not allege taking any further action until August 13, 2012, when he 
submitted an inmate grievance form indicating that he had not received meals that 
allowed him to fast despite his completion of the required institutional forms to be added 
to the Ramadan participation list.  In it, he indicated that Muhammad had visited him at 
his cell on August 2 and advised him that he would be placed on the list to participate in 
the fast if he met all of the requirements to participate.  Mikell only mentioned one other 
                                              
1  The record conflicts with the parties’ representations of when Mikell was added to the 
participation list.  This date is immaterial to our resolution of his claims. 
 
2  Sibanda disputes Mikell’s account of this cell visit but also claims that he personally 
provided Mikell with the Ramadan participation paperwork before July 25. 
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institutional employee in the body of his grievance, who is not a party to this case.  The 
grievance was received on August 15, 2012; Sibanda denied the grievance on August 27. 
Ramadan ended on August 18.  Mikell represents that he accepted every regularly 
scheduled meal that was brought to him throughout the entire month of Ramadan after 
July 20.  He claims that he did so because he was saving food items to consume as a pre-
dawn and post-sunset meal every day.  Defendants represent that Mikell was likely not 
provided the meals to participate in the fast because he accepted his regularly scheduled 
meals throughout the month of Ramadan.  SCI-Greene’s Ramadan participation form 
states that inmates who consume regularly scheduled meals may be removed from 
participation in the fast.  However, defendants have not definitively established why 
Mikell failed to receive the meals. 
Mikell pursued his administrative appeal through the highest level, but his final 
appeal was ultimately dismissed as untimely in January 2013.3  He filed a complaint in 
the District Court in August 2014, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against numerous prison officials in their individual capacities for infringing on 
                                              
3  It does not appear that Mikell properly exhausted his administrative remedies.  See 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (explaining that “proper exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is necessary” to fulfill the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
exhaustion requirement); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  However, defendants did not 
raise the issue of exhaustion in their summary judgment motion or subsequent briefs, 
although they did mention it in their answer to Mikell’s complaint.  As defendants have 
the “burden of proving the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust remedies,” we will 
address the merits of Mikell’s claims against them.  See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 
112 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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his ability to freely exercise his religion by participating in the Ramadan fast, as protected 
by the First Amendment.  Mikell voluntarily dismissed his claims against three 
defendants; his claims against four defendants proceeded to summary judgment.  Those 
defendants — Sibanda, Muhammad, Dittsworth, and another Food Service Supervisor, 
Michael DeCarlo — moved for summary judgment on Mikell’s remaining claims against 
them.  Mikell also moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted defendants’ 
motion and denied Mikell’s.  Mikell timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment; thus, we apply the 
same standard as the district court.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is 
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable inferences are to be 
drawn in . . . favor” of the non-moving party.  Id. at 255.  However, “the non-movant 
may not rest on speculation and conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment.”  
Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016).  A mere “scintilla 
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of evidence” in support of the non-moving party does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
III. 
Individuals who are incarcerated “retain protections afforded by the First 
Amendment . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of 
religion.”  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citation 
omitted).  “[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not 
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of 
the corrections system.”  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).  When an inmate 
challenges a prison regulation that infringes upon his constitutional rights, courts apply a 
four-factor analysis set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). 
Although Mikell cited several prison policies in his summary judgment motion 
relating to food services and religious activities at SCI-Greene, he does not argue that any 
policy or practice infringed on his right to freely exercise his religion.  Rather, he claims 
that defendants individually and personally infringed upon his free exercise rights when 
they failed to provide meals compatible with his participation in the Ramadan fast despite 
the procedures that he had followed.  On the record before us, Mikell has failed to 
sufficiently link any defendant to his failure to receive meals to participate in the 2012 
Ramadan fast. 
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged 
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wrongs.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  A plaintiff may 
establish personal involvement by demonstrating “personal direction or . . . actual 
knowledge and acquiescence,” which must be shown “with appropriate particularity.”  Id. 
First, regarding Food Service Supervisors DeCarlo and Dittsworth, Mikell has not 
shown that they interfered with his Ramadan fast participation.  He makes no specific 
allegations regarding any interaction he may have had with DeCarlo.  Mikell’s only 
interaction with Dittsworth occurred immediately after he was transferred to SCI-Greene 
and submitted a request form to a Food Services Supervisor indicating his intent to 
participate in the Ramadan fast.  After Dittsworth informed Mikell that he needed to 
contact the Chaplaincy Department in order to participate in the fast, Mikell did not 
communicate with Dittsworth further to inform him that he was not receiving meals 
despite his placement on the participation list.  Because there is no evidence that either 
DeCarlo or Dittsworth ever knew that Mikell had not received meals to observe the fast 
or that either defendant was personally involved in his meal delivery, summary judgment 
was properly granted in their favor. 
Next, Mikell’s claim against Muhammad lacks merit.  At most, Mikell alleges that 
he informed Muhammad that he had not received meals to observe the fast soon after his 
transfer and that Muhammad responded that if he were on the list, he should begin 
receiving meals to participate.  There is no evidence that Mikell followed up with 
Muhammad to inform him that he had not begun receiving the meals despite his 
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placement on the participation list.  As Mikell does not indicate how Muhammad 
specifically interfered with the free exercise of his religion, Muhammad was also entitled 
to summary judgment. 
Finally, Mikell’s claim against Sibanda cannot survive summary judgment.  
Mikell claims that Sibanda personally confirmed that he was on the participation list and 
informed him that he would immediately begin to receive meals to observe the fast.  It is 
undisputed that Mikell was on the list and that he nonetheless never received the 
requested meals.  However, there is no evidence that Mikell communicated with Sibanda 
after the alleged cell visit for the rest of Ramadan or otherwise informed Sibanda of the 
problem.  Sibanda did respond to the grievance that Mikell submitted in August 2012, but 
the grievance was not directed at Sibanda and made no mention of him.  Further, it was 
only received by the prison three days before Ramadan ended; there is no evidence that 
Sibanda knew of the grievance before the end of Ramadan.  Although Mikell expected 
Sibanda to take some unidentified additional action to ensure that he could fast, he waited 
weeks until Ramadan was nearly over before bringing the discrepancy to anyone’s 
attention, while accepting his regularly scheduled meals three times a day. 
By some still-unknown occurrence, Mikell continued to receive his regularly 
scheduled meals despite his placement on the Ramadan participation list, but there is no 
evidence that Sibanda was involved beyond overseeing Mikell’s undisputed placement on 
the list.  Mikell has not shown that Sibanda knowingly or intentionally interfered with his 
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free exercise of his religion.  Cf. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 219 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “negligent acts by officials causing unintended denials of religious rights do 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause” because a plaintiff “must assert conscious or 
intentional interference with his free exercise rights to state a valid claim under § 1983”).  
Thus, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Sibanda.  
 
